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ABSTRACT
The funeral of Jomo Kenyatta, Kenya’s ﬁrst president, offers
revealing evidence of the intimacy and depth of Britain’s
continuing relationship with this former colony 15 years
after independence. First approached by leading Kenyans
for assistance in planning the funeral in 1968, British policy-
makers willingly became involved, and continued low-level
preparations for this over the following decade. When
Kenyatta ﬁnally died, in 1978, British advice and planning
lay behind the central elements of a funeral which
incoming president Daniel arap Moi used to publicly
demonstrate his succession. Yet the story of the funeral also
shows that the relationship was sometimes incoherent and
drew on multiple, sometimes cross-cutting, personal ties
and institutional links, both political and military; neither
the funeral itself nor Kenya’s politics worked to a script
written by British ofﬁcials.
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The British press coverage of the funeral in 1978 of Jomo Kenyatta, Kenya’s ﬁrst
president, highlighted a moment of diplomatic near-embarrassment. Prince
Charles, heir to the British throne, was seated only two places from Idi Amin
—the president of Uganda and a man who had established himself in the
British popular imagination as the embodiment of all that was wrong with
post-colonial African leadership. The Times reported excitedly that Charles ‘nar-
rowly missed having his hand seized’ by Amin.1 This near miss—dismissed by
the British high commissioner as ‘entirely mythical’—was soon forgotten.2 A
more historically signiﬁcant aspect of the grand pageant of the funeral was cap-
tured by the rumour reported in the UK press that the gun carriage, ﬂown from
Britain for the occasion, was the one that had been used in the state funeral of
Winston Churchill.3 It is hard to imagine a more striking symbol of the trans-
formation in British attitudes towards Kenyatta. Only 18 years earlier he had
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been denounced by Kenya’s governor as ‘the African leader to darkness and
death’;4 now, he was being placed on a par with (perhaps even on the gun car-
riage of) the most famous British politician of the century.
British inﬂuence at this funeral was far more entrenched than this press cov-
erage suggested, and had a much longer history than the few days after Kenya-
tta’s death on 22 August 1978. In fact, the British High Commission had ﬁrst
been consulted on the potential funeral in 1968. The funeral planning shows
the continuing depth and intimacy of the relationship between the governments
of Britain and Kenya almost 15 years after independence. Senior ﬁgures in the
Kenyan government turned to the British in the ﬁrst instance to ask for
advice and assistance; the British government was brought into contingency
plans which involved only a few in the highest circles of power in Kenya; and
British policy-makers willingly provided assistance. The planning (and perform-
ance) of the funeral offers valuable insights into a relationship which recent
scholarship has shown to be both close and complex.
In the immediate decades after independence, the post-colonial Anglo-
Kenyan relationship was often framed as neo-colonialism. Inspired by a
world-systems approach, this was coupled with theories of dependency and
underdevelopment. Leys highlighted continuities which remained after indepen-
dence to argue that the unequal colonial relationship was altered only minimally
by independence.5 Such arguments have been premised on the idea that, as
Chikeka has argued, the European colonisers ‘traded positions of political
power with positions of inﬂuence’, and thus the interests of Kenya remained
subservient to those of Britain.6 The critical weakness of that strand of depen-
dency literature was its limited discussion of how dependency worked in prac-
tice, focused as it typically was on the abstract with little evidence of
mechanisms. Particularly relevant to this article, it failed to either question or
explore the ways in which governments, and more particularly groups within
governments, talked to one another.
More recent historiography on Kenya has nuanced our understanding of this
relationship. Britain’s post-colonial signiﬁcance to Kenya has been widely recog-
nised as part of a wider debate in which scholars have highlighted continuities
and colonial legacies, increasingly ‘treating independence as an artiﬁcial histori-
cal divide’.7 In Kenya, these continuities formed part of a broader process of
nation-building occurring in multiple and varied ways that were often heavily
inﬂuenced by the colonial legacy, for example with a continued focus upon
development and statism.8 Despite the brutal British repression of Mau Mau,
Kenya’s post-colonial leaders continued to look towards Britain in many
areas, of which Kenyatta’s funeral offers just one example.9
Yet by contrast, much of the literature on British foreign policy quickly and
cleanly removes the majority of the empire at independence. These histories
have tended to focus on Europe and America and lack substantive discussion
of relations with former African colonies, with limited academic interest in
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continuities.10 An extreme example of this comes from Northedge who, survey-
ing the previous 30 years of British foreign policy in the mid-1970s, saw the end
of empire as decisive: ‘colonial policy disappeared with the passing of the colo-
nial empire. Relations between Britain and the now independent states of the
Commonwealth were then conducted… in the same way as relations with any
other state.’11 Northedge’s argument is clearly mistaken, as the work of those
scholars interested in the Kenyan side has shown. As Darwin has rightly recog-
nised, ‘[e]xternal alterations concealed inner continuities’.12
As this study of British involvement in the funeral planning for Kenyatta indi-
cates, this was much more a process of negotiation on both sides. There was no
lack of interest in Kenya from the British Foreign and Commonwealth Ofﬁce
(FCO) and predecessors; nor was there a dictatorial neo-colonial control.
Funeral planning was instead one of many aspects of a negotiation through
which the relationship was pursued, reafﬁrmed and remade, to the mutual
beneﬁt of groups within both the British and Kenyan governments. Certainly,
British ofﬁcials promoted British models upon which to base the funeral pro-
ceedings and British ﬁrms to implement these; yet they did so after being
asked to provide this by Kenyan politicians pursuing their own agendas.
Despite Kenya’s publicly stated foreign policy being ‘positive non-alignment’,
in reality Kenya remained Western- and particularly British-oriented.13
Although Britain’s predominant position was challenged during the 1970s as
others gained a larger economic stake in Kenya, it was not until after Kenyatta’s
death that the US signed a formal military agreement with Kenya.14 Britain was
one of Kenya’s largest sources of foreign trade throughout this period, with Brit-
ain’s aid programme to Kenya one of its largest in Africa.15 In the military
sphere, Britain remained among Kenya’s major suppliers as well as offering
training. Kenya had only two public defence agreements during Kenyatta’s pre-
sidency: one with Ethiopia against possible Somali aggression, the other a 1964
Memorandum of Understanding with Britain, as well as a private Anglo-Kenyan
understanding promising consultation over Somali aggression.16 The funeral
assistance was thus situated in the context of a much broader military and econ-
omic relationship in which Kenyan politicians routinely looked towards Britain.
British pageantry and pomp, tradition and ritual have a long history, and are
often acknowledged as something the British state does, and has historically
done, well—and by which British ofﬁcials and politicians have been more
than a little obsessed.17 Cannadine in particular has examined the role of cer-
emony within the British Empire, and Murphy has recently highlighted the
monarchy’s role in post-imperial British symbolism and ceremony.18 State
and royal funerals have long been important occasions in Britain. Churchill’s
state funeral in January 1965 (codenamed Operation Hope Not) was viewed
worldwide and attended by global leaders and statesmen from 112 countries.19
Studies of the ‘invention of tradition’ in Africa have tended to focus on the colo-
nial era, and the devising of new rituals—both imperial and ‘traditional’—at the
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start of the colonial period.20 Yet there was also a signiﬁcant creation of tra-
ditions at the other end of the colonial period, in the making of post-colonial
states. A range of rituals and institutions was devised to legitimate newly inde-
pendent states.21 African nationalist parties had to create symbols, traditions of
leadership and party structures; new forms of commemoration and celebration
were required, such as Jamhuri Day and Kenyatta Day in Kenya. Yet Kenyatta’s
funeral showed that the inﬂuence of the outgoing metropole did not end with—a
perfect example of this newly invented tradition—the lowering of the colonial
ﬂag and raising of its independent replacement.22
There is an extensive literature concerning death rituals and funerals in
African states, recognising their signiﬁcance as ‘a contested space within
which deeper struggles over state power and communal identity could be signi-
ﬁed’.23 But, although Metcalf and Huntington have recognised that ‘funerals of
heads of state are often grand and highly politicized events’, this literature has
rarely focused on presidential funerals.24 A key issue has been that of ethnicity,
burial place and autochthony.25 In Kenya, this had been signiﬁcant after the
assassination in 1969 of Tom Mboya, who, despite his reputation as a supra-
ethnic leader, was buried at Rusinga Island and became ‘in death what he had
not been in life: an ethnic hero’,26 while after the death of S. M. Otineo this
was the primary debate.27 Yet with Kenyatta’s death these questions did not
seem to emerge: Kenyatta was the ‘father of the nation’ and, despite his clear
Kikuyu base, he remained a national ﬁgure in death, buried in the capital
Nairobi. Kenyatta’s funeral was also unusual as it was not, as Jindra and
Noret have argued African funerals often are, ‘one of the key sites of the anthro-
pological production of the image of “traditional” Africa’.28 Rather, leading
Kenyans self-consciously sought to portray an image not of ‘tradition’, but of
a ‘modern’ nation-state following state funeral practices recognised by and
imported from Britain.
Contingency Planning in 1968
Despite British colonial anxieties about Kenya’s independence and Kenyatta, the
Anglo-Kenyan relationship was close by 1968, and Kenyatta privileged within
this.29 In May 1968 Kenyatta suffered a stroke.30 To put it bluntly, it was not pre-
dicted that Kenyatta would remain alive for long. Kenyatta never wanted to plan
for his death; indeed, it was often one of the frustrations of British and Kenyan
policy-makers that he did not prepare for this by unreservedly nominating his
successor.31 Clearly in response to this, in June the British High Commission
in Nairobi was approached by Bruce McKenzie to discuss arrangements for Ken-
yatta’s death. McKenzie was the only European to be given a ministerial position
in Kenya at independence and often acted as an intermediary between the
Kenyan and British governments. The British High Commission considered
him ‘an inﬂuential friend at court’.32
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At three initial, secret, consultations McKenzie and members of the British
High Commission, including the high commissioner, two ﬁrst secretaries and
a counsellor, together produced a list of questions to plan the president’s
funeral. This covered a range of speciﬁc details including the timing and location
of the funeral, the cofﬁn, transport, lying-in-state, guests and burial.33 McKenzie
was concerned ‘that adequate preparations should be made for a ﬁrst class State
Funeral which the world would expect on Kenyatta’s death. If carried out efﬁ-
ciently and with dignity it will contribute to Kenya’s prestige abroad and to pol-
itical stability at home’, goals shared by British policy-makers.34 In moving
forward, McKenzie was to present this as his own work, and the British input
was not to be revealed; there was evident concern that other Kenyans might
be less positive about British involvement.35 McKenzie took this initial list of
questions to a meeting on 19 June 1968 with Vice-President Daniel arap Moi,
Minister for Defence Njoroge Mungai and Attorney-General Charles Njonjo
(though Njonjo did not in fact attend).36 Those invited were among the most
prominent and powerful of Kenya’s politicians, and their involvement, along
with the secrecy surrounding the planning, shows the signiﬁcance attached to
these plans. These three were also key ﬁgures in the debate over the succession
to the presidency, a critical issue in Kenyan politics and one of great concern to
British policy-makers.37 In the same month, Kenya’s tenth constitutional
amendment meant that the vice-president would succeed automatically for 90
days, marking Moi as constitutionally the most likely successor, but with
Mungai always a potential contender. Thus, the high commissioner noted that
one of McKenzie’s aims had been ‘to establish Moi’s conﬁdence in Mungai,
which hitherto had been sadly lacking. It seems that the two got on very well
together on this occasion… The omission of Mungai has always been a weak-
ness in the system and this reconciliation is a valuable achievement.’38 This plan-
ning thus had the additional aim of encouraging cooperation among Kenya’s
elite. At the ﬁrst meeting, lasting ‘nearly ﬁve hours’, these men decided to for-
mally request British assistance, all (excluding McKenzie) believing this was
their ﬁrst involvement.39
Having been asked to assist, the head of the East Africa Department (EAD)
replied to the high commissioner: ‘we shall get to work here and give all the
help we can.’40 According to a British diplomat who acted as a ‘liaison’ on
this, policy was to ‘offer any advice which the Kenyans might request’.41 At
the simplest level, the British government was asked to provide details of the cer-
emonial of previous British state funerals, and these were obtained from the Lord
Chamberlain’s ofﬁce.42 The Commonwealth Ofﬁce went further and began to
draw the preparations into the specialised language and practice of British
state funerals, suggesting that ‘Ministry of Public Buildings and Works could
probably supply design for catafalque and the ﬁrm of Garrards prepare depos-
itum plate in advance’.43 The EAD also raised the possibility of using a gun car-
riage for the funeral.44 Given that Kenya clearly did not own one, there must be
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some scepticism as to whether Kenyan planners would have seen a gun carriage
as necessary had it not been posited as such by the British. The EAD already
seemed willing to consider arranging the loan of those items they considered
essential to the funeral. The funeral was planned for St. Andrew’s Presbyterian
Kirk on the sixth day after Kenyatta’s death.45
The High Commission also raised the possibility of preparing a cofﬁn in
Britain to be ﬂown out with a team of morticians at the time of death.46 The
Commonwealth Ofﬁce suggested the ﬁrm of J. H. Kenyon for the cofﬁn and
embalmer. The choice of this ﬁrm was an obvious one: they had been involved
in many royal funerals, had embalmed King George VI and Churchill and were
experienced in repatriations of bodies from overseas.47 The Lord Chamberlain’s
ofﬁce introduced McKenzie to John Kenyon, Lieutenant Colonel John Johnston
of the Lord Chamberlain’s ofﬁce and Kenneth Newis from the Ministry of Public
Buildings andWorks.48 At the same time as being so involved in the behind-the-
scenes planning of the funeral, however, Tallboys of the Commonwealth Ofﬁce
was keen to keep these introductions private. He argued that:
It would have been most unwise to run the unnecessary risk of having the ‘Royal
undertaker’ recognised arriving in Downing Street and attending a meeting at the
Commonwealth Ofﬁce at the same time as the well known Kenya Minister of Agricul-
ture…Once the Lord Chamberlain’s ofﬁce has given the necessary advice and made
the essential introductions it would seem unnecessary, and perhaps undesirable, that
we should continue to play an active role in the advance planning for the demise of
their President.49
Though he did not rule out ‘further material assistance’ or acting as a ‘postbox’,50
it was clear that he was reluctant to lead, or be seen to lead, this process.
From within Kenya, another Briton was heavily involved in the 1968 plan-
ning. Colonel Anderson was chief of defence staff of the Kenyan army and
the highest-ranking British serviceman in Kenya at this time, with his promotion
being arranged to brigadier and ‘Commander, British Services Training teams
and Adviser to the Minister for Defence, Kenya’ in order to enhance and main-
tain the strong British military advisory presence in Kenya.51 Anderson wrote to
Kenyons in October 1968 with the speciﬁcs for the cofﬁn. ‘The Casket is to be
made of Meru Oak—of the ASTON design and should have silver oxydised
handles and embellishments and be zinc lined’; a vault and death mask of the
president were also requested.52 This was all to be prepared immediately; Kenya-
tta’s cofﬁn was to be made in Britain and wait for him. As well as the cofﬁn, there
was also a question of morticians: ‘It is understood that you would need four
people to ﬂy to Kenya—a director, embalmer, mask maker and one man to
train the bearer party’. A British embalmer from Kenyons was requested to
‘hold himself in readiness to ﬂy to Kenya on the ﬁrst available plane’ and a
list of ﬂights departing each day from capitals around Europe was attached.53
The plan was set for death at any moment.
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A Decade of Waiting: 1968–78
Kenyatta proved more robust than anticipated, but during the following decade
speculation on his death was rife, with the presidential succession one of the
foremost political issues. This period witnessed Britain’s withdrawal from east
of Suez and entry into the European Economic Community—apparent evidence
of post-imperial decline.54 Yet, while the anticipated future funeral of an African
president was not a pressing concern for most of the FCO, relations with Kenya
remained signiﬁcant and within the EAD the funeral was not forgotten, though
British involvement in planning became more sporadic and was not a continu-
ing focus of interaction with members of the Kenyan government. For example,
condolence letters from the prime minister, queen, and FCO were prepared and
occasionally revised, ready to send upon the president’s death.55
In July 1972 the High Commission reported having ‘searched our Top Secret
ﬁles recently… [for] a check list of actions which we might have to take’ at the
time of Kenyatta’s death—which they could not ﬁnd.56 As a result, from at least
1973 there was a ﬁrm plan in the EAD for the action to be taken upon news of
Kenyatta’s death, including informing various departments within the FCO,
notifying the undertakers, giving details to those who were likely to wish to
attend the funeral, sending condolence messages and signing the condolence
book.57 The EAD recorded that the embalmer from Kenyons was ‘fully
briefed and ready to move’.58 In 1973, the High Commission was concerned
that there were gaps in their knowledge of the planning. Their main concern
was the idea of ‘a series of code words’ to indicate various scenarios about the
president’s health, which could be used to direct information from the High
Commission to the FCO and then to the ﬁrm of Kenyons ready to ﬂy out
with the cofﬁn.59 The suggestion had apparently been mooted in 1968 but the
High Commission returned to it in 1973, unsure whether this had in fact
been instituted, and thinking that ‘the idea still seems a good one’.60 The FCO
decided, however, that this ‘would only serve to complicate matters’, as there
were only two possible situations: when the president died, which would be
public knowledge, and if this was ‘imminent’, when they could alert the embal-
mer to be ready to leave.61 The idea of creating code words is symptomatic of the
semi-clandestine nature of these preparations, as well as showing that the per-
formance of procedure was important even internally within the British
government.
Royal attendance at the funeral was discussed from 1970, when it emerged as
a dispute, albeit a reasonably minor one, between the FCO and the Protocol and
Conference Department. The position agreed in 1963 had been that the high
commissioner would be the queen’s representative at the funeral.62 In 1970
the EAD regarded this as unacceptable and wanted representation at a much
more senior level: Prince Philip or Prince Charles was recommended.63 As the
queen herself would not attend, this was the highest possible level of royal
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representation. Murphy has described the decisions surrounding royal attend-
ance at independence celebrations, with higher-ranking royals attending the
most important ceremonies, and many of the same attitudes and assumptions
seem to have prevailed in the debate over which member of the royal family
would attend the funeral of Kenyatta.64
The staff of the EAD viewed the monarchy as an instrument of British policy.
They also, no doubt, saw the occasion of the funeral as the opportunity for some
bureaucratic one-upmanship, a royal assertion of the importance of the part of the
world with which they dealt. The palace wasmore cautious, raising concerns ‘that
representation of The Queen by a member of the Royal Family on that occasion
would create a precedent’ of royal attendance at funerals of Commonwealth heads
of state, which they were disinclined tomake.65 Le Tocq, head of the EAD, argued
in his reply that ‘British interests in Kenya would suffer a severe blow if British
representation… is not at an appropriate level’.66 He was keen to highlight
Kenya’s signiﬁcance to those who would ultimately make the decision. The
EAD thus stressed that this kind of precedent would not be created, suggesting
ﬁve reasons which meant Kenyatta’s case merited ‘exceptional treatment’:
i. President Kenyatta’s high place in the history of the development of new nation states in
Africa.
ii. His very exceptional and close relationship with this country through bad and good
days over many years.
iii. His unusually advanced age.
iv. His stature as an African, and indeed perhaps world, ﬁgure.
v. His position as the founder of Independent Kenya and the fact that he has been Presi-
dent of a major ex-British African State for longer than any other one.67
The ﬁrst point on this list was crucial: observers often viewed Kenya as a rare
success in Africa and this was widely attributed to Kenyatta personally.68 A hand-
written minute suggested the few who would qualify for this level of represen-
tation: Nehru, Haile Selassie, Kenyatta and Menzies.69 (Indeed, the EAD was
concurrently considering representation and condolence letters for the funeral
of Haile Selassie.)70 The brevity of this list suggests the signiﬁcance the EAD
attributed to Britain’s relationship with Kenya, and more particularly with Ken-
yatta himself. The palace agreed that either Prince Charles or Prince Philip
would attend the funeral, and this was welcomed in the FCO as a symbol of
the importance which British politicians and the crown attached to Kenya.71
After Death: 1978
By 1978, the EAD’s previously positive views of Kenyatta were shifting as he
grew older and increasingly inept. The EAD had also come to favour Moi as pre-
sidential successor.72 Moi had the support of several leading Kenyans British
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diplomats considered their allies, notably Njonjo, Minister for Finance Mwai
Kibaki and McKenzie until his assassination by a bomb in 1978. British
policy-makers thus expected Moi to prove most beneﬁcial for British interests.
On 22 August 1978, President Kenyatta died in Mombasa. Kenyatta’s death
meant the climax of the succession struggle. The funeral was drawn into a
process—part planned, part ad hoc—through which Moi and his supporters
moved rapidly to install and conﬁrm Moi in power. According to Karimi and
Ochieng, Mungai, Moi’s main rival in the succession, had planned a purge of
the Moi faction to be executed upon Kenyatta’s death, but was taken by surprise
by Kenyatta dying in Mombasa rather than Nakuru, and Moi’s supporters acted
immediately to propel him to power.73 It is unclear quite how exaggerated some
of these retrospective accounts may have been, but there clearly were plots
against Moi. In organising a successful and elaborate funeral, Moi was
showing his statesmanship and ability to act in a presidential capacity as the
stability and prestige of the new Kenyan leadership was being proved: ‘the pol-
itical wake is also a political baptism.’74 The funeral was a demonstration of a
stable transfer of power, aimed at a national and international audience, and
British ofﬁcials were happy to cooperate, favouring stability which would
protect their interests. Tamarkin has argued that Kenya’s ‘transition seemed a
well-planned, well-rehearsed and magniﬁcently orchestrated operation’.75 The
funeral helped to establish this impression.
In the days immediately following Kenyatta’s death, the EAD engaged in a
ﬂurry of activity, with multiple urgent telegrams sent between the EAD and
the High Commission, as well as communications with Kenyan politicians
and debate within the FCO.76 The prepared condolence letters were sent. The
major change from the drafts was the decision that the prime minister would
address Moi as ‘Mr. President’ rather than ‘Mr. Acting President’ as
planned.77 This was a reaction to the way the succession struggle was playing
out in Kenya. Moi had been sworn in as president rather than acting president
under the constitution’s provision for a 90-day interim in which the vice-presi-
dent would succeed automatically. The semantic distinction was evidently con-
sidered important: the High Commission sent back the signed copy of the letter
for the prime minister to re-issue.78 The FCO had long predicted potential vio-
lence and instability after Kenyatta’s death, but the immediate reaction in Kenya
was described as ‘stunned calm’, with growing optimism in the High Commis-
sion as the situation remained stable.79
However carefully earlier plans had been laid in London, events after Kenya-
tta’s death saw a degree of muddle and improvisation, which suggests that the
earlier funeral plans were not widely known within the Kenyan government
and hints at the endemic fractiousness of the Kenyan state, as well as a certain
lack of coordination in London. Yet, despite forgetting previous plans,
Kenyan policy-makers turned once again to the British government. In the
event, instead of the British contacting and sending the ﬁrm of Kenyons,
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which had prepared a cofﬁn and planned to send an embalmer, a new arrange-
ment was made which once more involved the British. Rather than going
through the planned and ofﬁcial channels, this highlighted the importance of
informal personal connections: the man approached, Frank Clayton, had been
‘superintendent of eight cemeteries in Nairobi for 20 years’ until 1968 and
was thus known by the mortuary keeper who contacted him.80 As Clayton
was not himself an embalmer, he turned to a colleague, Allan Sinclair, to
assist. Sinclair recalled, ‘When I was ﬁrst contacted I didn’t even have a passport’,
showing just how unprepared he was when asked to act as the embalmer, and he
arranged for a cofﬁn to be made and transported from Britain, unaware of any
previous plans.81 Sinclair’s manager reported in the press that ‘[a]t ﬁrst I thought
it was a joke’, while the high commissioner was expecting someone from the ﬁrm
of Kenyons to arrive.82 This still resulted in two British morticians departing for
Kenya and embalming Kenyatta’s body; however, rather than the implemen-
tation of a master plan, this was the result of a rapid process of improvisation
and personal connections.
In the days between Kenyatta’s death and funeral, the British government was
further consulted on additional aspects of the ceremonial. On the day of Kenya-
tta’s death, the Ministry of Defence (MOD) was asked for advice on the British
model for lying in state.83 This information was duly provided by Major Mather,
who had had this role at Churchill’s funeral, and who stayed up all night to write
his four-page telegram dictating the British forms of ceremonial. He included
information on the positioning of guards, their relief and rest patterns, transpor-
tation and visitation, with 16 ofﬁcers on duty at any time.84 This extraordinary
level of detail evidenced the British concern for ceremonial, ritual and procedure.
This was sent to Brigadier Cromwell Mkungusi, who would in 1983 become
chief of staff of Kenya’s armed forces, highlighting the continuing post-colonial
connections between the British and Kenyan militaries.85
The Kenyans also requested more tangible assistance from the British
military:
the loan of a gun carriage—which of course consists of a gun and a limber—50 rounds
of blank ammunition and a small team of ﬁve men which would be required to advise
on the ceremonial and to train the detachments of Kenyans who would escort the gun
carriage.86
As Britain was a major military supplier to Kenya, it made sense for the Kenyan
military to turn to the British MOD, where they already had links and connec-
tions, to request this equipment. All of these requests were granted with a
minimum of dispute or even discussion. The ﬁve soldiers who were to accom-
pany the gun carriage were led by Mather, though the FCO was anxious that
the British role should not be too public and Mather should play only a ‘low
key advisory role…We are particularly concerned not to be seen quote
running unquote the Kenyans’ arrangements.’87 This echoes the concern
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expressed by Tallboys in 1968 that Britain should not be seen to be leading the
arrangements; although willing to use this opportunity to assert their role as
patrons and mentors to the Kenyan government, British ofﬁcials were very
aware of the dangers of being publicly seen to be too controlling.
For the FCO, the potentially problematic request was the 50 rounds of blank
ammunition which would be necessary to follow the ‘detailed instructions for
ﬁring 21 gun salute’ which had been asked for by the Kenyan government
and provided.88 Sending ammunition—even blank—required clearance for
overﬂying and, with two possible routes, this necessitated permission from
nine countries.89 The secretary of the EAD afterwards ‘confess[ed] to momen-
tary concern when we were told of the need for overﬂying clearances, irrational
though such concern was given the nature of the cargo’.90 It was unlikely that
this would be refused, but the FCO’s rush to arrange this was partly an
attempt to remedy the damage caused to Britain’s reputation in Kenya as a mili-
tary supplier following the Entebbe raid in 1976. Then, the Kenyan government
had urgently requested ammunition against the rumoured threat of Ugandan
invasion, but the British had been unable to supply it quickly because of over-
ﬂying clearance refusals.91 This time, there were no such problems and all
requests were delivered.
The funeral offered a focus for a pro-Moi faction to assert their dominance in
a manner that emphasised continuity. The ﬁrst cabinet meetings under Moi’s
leadership concerned funeral arrangements, and a State Funeral Steering Com-
mittee was set up.92 It included Moi, Minister of Defence Muchemi and Minister
for Foreign Affairs Munyua Waiyaki who was ‘responsible for arrangements for
external representation at funeral’.93 Involved from the military were Army
Commander General Mulinge, Chief of Defence Staff Brigadier Kakenyi and
Permanent Secretary Kiereini. At this moment of transition, the military had
the potential to challenge Moi, but the funeral offered him the chance to
immediately work with key ﬁgures within it as their new commander-in-chief.
It was not long before Moi was receiving multiple declarations of support,
including from erstwhile rivals.94
Internally within the British government, a crucial question was about gov-
ernmental representation. Berridge has argued that ‘working funerals’ have
been used since the 1960s ‘to conduct diplomatic business’, and that the level
of representation was a means of ‘diplomatic signalling’ about the relationships
being sought and publicly promoted.95 That a senior government ﬁgure should
attend had already been decided.96 An immediate concern after hearing of the
death was to assess the foreign representation at the funeral, with telegrams
sent to probe the level of representation expected from other governments.97
The EAD argued that ‘[g]iven the closeness of our relations with Kenya we
can expect the Kenyans to pay particular attention to the level at which we
are represented’, and thought a cabinet minister most appropriate; the prime
minister considered attending, and quickly the foreign secretary ‘conﬁrmed
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his wish to attend’.98 In the event, the ofﬁcial British party consisted of the Prince
of Wales, Foreign Secretary David Owen, Lord Carrington representing the
Opposition and former Governor and High Commissioner Malcolm MacDo-
nald.99 Both Owen and Prince Charles met individually with Moi.100 The
British representation was of a relatively high level among the multiple
foreign delegations—the nature of which was, symptomatically, monitored in
assiduous detail by British diplomats.101
The service arranged by the Kenyan government occurred on the tenth day
after Kenyatta’s death in the grounds of Parliament House; again this was not
what had been planned a decade earlier.102 Comparing the opening address
from the funeral orders of service of Churchill and Kenyatta demonstrates
clear funerary plagiarism. Given that Kenyan policy-makers had asked to
receive programmes from Churchill’s funeral, it appears that those organising
the president’s funeral lifted the text almost entirely, editing only slight details.
Much of the service differed, but there were several other similarities, including
one of the hymns, the National Anthem, Last Post, Reveille and Air Force ﬂy past.
the burial of a great man who has rendered memorable service to his country and to
the cause of freedom. We shall think of him with thanksgiving that he was raised up in
our days of desperate need to be a leader and inspirer of the nation, for his dauntless
resolution and untiring vigilance and for his example of courage and endurance. We
shall commit his soul into the hands of God, the merciful Judge of all men and the giver
of eternal life, praying that the memory of his virtues and his achievements may
remain as a part of our national heritage, inspiring generations to come to emulate
his magnanimity and patriotic devotion.103
the burial of great son of Africa who has rendered memorable service to his country
and the Continent of Africa in the struggle for freedom and human dignity. We
shall think of him with thanksgiving, that he was raised up in our days of desperate
need, to be a leader and inspirer of the nation. For his dauntless resolution and untiring
vigilance, and for his example of courage, endurance and forgiveness, we give thanks to
God. We shall commit his soul into the hands of God, the merciful Judge of all men
and the giver of eternal life, praying that the memory of his virtues and his achieve-
ments, may remain as a part of our national heritage, inspiring generations to come
to emulate his magnanimity and patriotic devotion.104
Thus, although the focus on ceremony did reveal a British obsession, the
demand for ceremonial display was one shared by at least some leading
Kenyans. This was not shown just on the occasion of the funeral; as one
example, Kenyatta Day in 1970 had a similarly designed ‘souvenir programme’
to Kenyatta’s memorial programme, with a detailed programme of events
including a parade and ﬂypast by the Kenya Air Force.105 The funeral was
also not the only occasion upon which Moi and the British government collabo-
rated in a ceremonial display: on 12–14 June 1979 Moi paid a state visit to
Britain, an invitation he was recorded as being ‘obviously delighted’ to receive,
and at which he was treated in ‘elaborate ceremonial manner’.106 Although
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much of the British funeral involvement was private, that which was public—
such as the attendance and gun carriage loan—was widely reported and
visibly demonstrated British support for the new Kenyan regime, as well as
for the deceased Kenyatta. Moi used Kenyan ideas about widespread British
inﬂuence to his advantage in highlighting his support from Britain—which
British ofﬁcials were willing to provide as they saw their interests protected.
In helping to plan the funeral, British policy-makers were thus consolidating
their ties to the Kenya government, while Moi and those around him reafﬁrmed
their connection to Britain.
After the funeral, the British involved were self-congratulatory about their
handling of the arrangements. The high commissioner wrote that ‘Britain
gained a lot of kudos from this assistance, willingly given’,107 while ‘[i]t was a
matter of great satisfaction to President Moi, to members of the late President’s
family and to Kenyans generally’ that Prince Charles had attended.108 After the
funeral, the High Commission received a letter from Kiereini: ‘On behalf of the
Kenya Government, and as a member of State Funeral Steering Committee, I
take this opportunity to thank your Government for the assistance given to
us.’109 The British government had aimed to foster relations with their
Kenyan counterparts, particularly the new Kenyan president, and believed
they had successfully done so.
Yet even within the British government there was a lack of coordination, with
multiple channels of communication. In the months that followed the funeral a
dispute emerged between the EAD and the MOD concerning who would pay the
costs surrounding the loan of the gun carriage. The request had gone from the
Kenyan minister of defence, Muchemi, through the British High Commission’s
defence advisor to the British MOD, rather than through the FCO in the ﬁrst
instance, to the annoyance of the EAD.110 The MOD requested reimbursement
for ‘other incidental expenses’, estimating this bill at £500.111 EAD ofﬁcials
wanted to ‘resist strongly’, and argued that the MOD should pay some of the
costs.112 This concern over a really very small amount of money suggests that
the amount mattered less than the principle of not being asked beforehand.
This inter-departmental bickering is revealing, with criticism from the EAD
that the MOD ‘seem to operate without a great deal of coordination, and…
seem to take actions without considering who is going to pay’.113 The MOD
argued that ‘our only alternative would be to request payment from the
Kenyan authorities’, but for the EAD, despite their dislike of being forced to
pay this additional and unexpected, albeit small, expense, the relationship
with the new Moi presidency and the goodwill generated by the funeral was
far more signiﬁcant than any departmental dispute.114 Eventually, the MOD
reduced the ﬁgure to £184 and the FCO offered £84.115 This provides an inter-
esting ending to the story of British involvement in the funeral: though keen to
get involved, the EAD actors felt themselves more alive to the political complex-
ities, and were concerned not to be seen as leading this process. The military, by
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contrast, enjoyed ritual and had no hesitation in getting involved immediately,
seemingly without consideration of costs and consequences.
Conclusion
The detail of Britain’s involvement in planning President Kenyatta’s funeral indi-
cates something of the nature of the post-colonial Anglo-Kenyan relationship as
policy-makers from both countries aimed to continue this. The formal end of
colonialism was not the end of British involvement and interest in former colo-
nies. Ceremonial occasions, such as Kenyatta’s funeral, offered an opportunity
for the British state to display this publicly. The monarchy was an essential
policy tool for those in the FCO as ameans of symbolising the value they attached
to such relationships. The Royal Family had a key role in the post-war Common-
wealth in demonstrating the importance of connections with former colonies.
The literature has suggested a shift in Kenyan politics over the period covered
by this article: from a nationalist, nation-building and development-focused
phase in the 1960s to a less optimistic 1970s of economic crisis.116 Kenyatta’s
funeral planning, however, suggests a more limited change in the way key indi-
viduals in Kenya related to their British counterparts, and vice versa. In the late
1970s Moi and his allies still turned to the British, masters of ceremonial, to assist
with preparations; British diplomats and soldiers barely hesitated in their accep-
tance of this role. Multiple personal and institutional ties led Kenyans to turn to
Britain in 1978, even though the ‘plan’made a decade earlier had been known by
few and mostly forgotten. The relationship was complex, involving connections
at varying levels within government, and shows the importance of examining
bilateral relationships at a nuanced and detailed level. Groups and individuals
pursued their own, sometimes conﬂicting or contradictory, agendas; yet often,
as in the case of Kenyatta’s funeral, agendas could coincide. Below the top
level of government, multiple contacts and individual relationships sustained
this diplomacy. Part of the strategy decided upon by Kenya’s incoming leaders
in the early 1960s had been to accept and take over an established administrative
and economic system rather than change it, and to maintain a close relationship
with the British government and military.117 The planning for, and performance
of, Kenyatta’s funeral reveals the continuing negotiations which underlay the
relationship; as the high commissioner’s 1978 annual review put it: ‘President
Moi and his leading associates made it clear that they still regard Britain as
Kenya’s best friend.’118
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